Narrative, intersectionality and argumentative discourse by Morris, Justin Ross
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM
Narrative, intersectionality and argumentative
discourse
Justin Ross Morris
University of Windsor, Department of Philosophy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Justin Ross Morris, "Narrative, intersectionality and argumentative discourse" (May 22, 2013). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 119.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/119
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-13. 
Narrative, intersectionality and argumentative discourse 
 
JUSTIN ROSS MORRIS 
 
Department of Philosophy  
University of Windsor 
401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, ON 
morris19@uwindsor.ca  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that a “use-based” approach to narrative and narrative arguments 
provides the kind of conceptual architecture necessary for developing a much-needed intersectional 
analysis of arguers’ identities, their arguments, and the contexts that inform their positions. Without 
such an approach, we risk coming away with an understanding of narrative argument that, at best, 
fails to capture its dynamism, or, worse yet, risks being conditioned on methodologically 
ethnocentric grounds. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
There is an ongoing debate in narratological circles regarding the traditional 
interpretation of narrative as a methodological constant and whether it should be 
abandoned in favour of a more dynamic, less rigid model. With strong incompatible 
convictions on both sides of the aisle, consensus appears not to be forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, what is philosophically interesting about this impasse is that a 
growing number of narratologists are beginning to question if the whole narrative-
defining enterprise is a futile, superfluous exercise in competitive academic ink 
spilling. Their thinking is that in a folk psychological sense we already intuitively 
know what a narrative is and does, but that “we do so without noticing or troubling 
ourselves about it, and certainly without recourse to the definitions narratologists 
make of their subject matter” (Rudrum, 2006, p. 203). Perhaps this is right. But, for 
those of us who cannot resist the temptation of troubling ourselves with narrative, it 
has become exceedingly obvious that the difficulties in defining it are not 
idiosyncratic to narratology; rather, they speak to the vexing complications 
inextricably linked to the tricky business of assigning fixed definitions to anything at 
all, for “it inevitably turns out that for every generalization there is an exception . . . 
and for every definition there is always room for further definition, as extraneous 
elements creep into our classifications” (p. 197). Of course, those exceptions to our 
classifications are not always a necessary byproduct of the limitations of the concept 
in question.1 To this end, a major claim of this paper is that scholars in 
                                                        
1 The topic of nominalism—its problems, challenges, and ongoing debates—looms large over this 
discussion and is the source of many philosophical disputes in its own right. And I do not pretend to 
have a solution to any of the metaphysical puzzles it presents. I am simply calling attention to the fact 
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argumentation theory and informal logic who take up the daunting task of defining 
and developing the notion of “narrative argument” will find themselves presented 
with similar challenges identified by those narratologists ready to give up on the 
project of defining narrative—challenges that, so far as I can tell, have yet to be 
adequately addressed, much less overcome.  
To get a sense of these difficulties in action we will pay close attention to 
Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayers’ (2012) recent discussion of narrative arguments. I 
intend to show that the limits of their definitional constraints (and the problematic 
assumptions underwriting them) lead them to severely underestimate the 
argumentative value of narrative. They, however, paint these constraints as though 
they were inadequacies tethered to the inherent implausibility of narrative 
arguments themselves. Thus, by way of contrast, I argue for a “use-based” approach 
to narrative and narrative arguments. This way the conclusions drawn are 
empirically informed and the theoretical focus is kept on how narratives are 
commonly used. From this basis, I argue that the use-based approach provides us 
with the kind of conceptual architecture needed for developing a much-needed 
intersectional analysis of arguers’ identities, their arguments, and the contexts that 
inform their positions.  
 
2. USE IT OR LOSE IT: A METHODOLOGICAL REORIENTATION TO NARRATIVE 
 
Of those narratologists in favour of abandoning the traditional interpretation of 
narrative, David Rudrum (2006) suggests that instead of trying to formulate a pithy 
definition of it, “one would do better to focus on use rather than representation” (p. 
201). The emphasis on use not only recalls but is heavily inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
oft-cited maxim: “Don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use.” This recommendation, 
in turn, stems from Wittgenstein’s (2010) claim that for a “large class of cases—
though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: 
‘the meaning of a word is its use in language’” (p. xxiii). And as we know, language, 
for Wittgenstein, is taken to be a “form of life.” If Rudrum is right, the same holds 
true for narrative: if one wants to know what the meaning of narrative is, she had 
better be observing how it functions “within a cultural matrix of meanings, beliefs, 
and normative practices” (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 170).2 This is no easy task. Because as 
Danièle M. Klapproth (2004) points out, even what is “narratable might vary widely 
from one culture to another” (p. 10). By overemphasizing the supposed universal 
features of a preferred definition of narrative, then, we could end up insisting on an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that sometimes there is an interest (epistemic or otherwise) conditioning a putative theorist’s 
adherence to the constraints of her definitional commitments. On this view, as we will see, self-
imposed constraints can come to be (mistakenly) viewed as general constraints of the concept in 
question.  
2 Within the realm of fiction Wolfgang Iser (1989) has made a similar case by suggesting that the 
more “fiction eludes an ontological definition, the more unmistakably it presents itself in terms of its 
use. If it is no longer confined to an explanatory function, its impact becomes its prominent feature. 
Impacts, however, can only be made on or within given contexts, which, in turn, condition the 
respective use fiction is meant to achieve” [emphasis mine] (p. 267).   
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understanding of it (and narrative argument) that, at best, fails to capture its 
plasticity, or, at worst, risks being conditioned on methodologically ethnocentric 
grounds—a point to which we shall return later.   
So, right off the bat it is clear that a use-based approach cannot promise us 
the comfort and security one gets from an adherence to a positive and concrete 
definition of narrative. Instead, it saddles us with a complicated question that, for 
the most part, cannot be answered in abstracto: who (agent) is the narrator and 
what (act) is she hoping to achieve and why (aim)? Mercifully, determining the who, 
what and why of narrative-use does not require us to identify what is common to all 
possible forms of narrative—a project that may very well be doomed from the start 
given that narratives “form a complex family of many different kinds of language 
games, all of them mutable depending on the narrative context” (Rudrum, 2006, p. 
200). A far more nuanced approach is needed. One where it is understood that 
searching for “a common set of rules or a neat definition to encapsulate them all is a 
move that should always be treated with caution and wariness” (ibid.).  
But suppose, caution and wariness duly heeded, one accepts the use-based 
approach as the right way to make sense of narrative and thus narrative arguments; 
won’t some elements still need to be deemed essential and nonessential? It seems 
like it. But if that’s the case, then won’t we need to insist on some boundaries 
between these elements even if they are not, strictly speaking, “definitional”? If this 
answer is “yes”—and it seems like it should be—then we have a problem. Because 
then one has to admit that the use-based approach is predicated on a devastating 
contradiction: on the one hand, narrative is said to resist concrete definition; on the 
other, it is suggested that, essentially, we ought to define it in terms of its use. 
Consequently, the use-based approach appears to be felled by the very problems it 
was designed to avoid.  
Two points are important to emphasize to see why this apparent 
contradiction has no real legs to stand on: First, definitional constraints need not 
always be pernicious. In fact, they are a necessary precondition for the possibility of 
meaningful language (which would otherwise be a chaotic mess without them). 
Nevertheless, and this is the second point, when it comes to slippery concepts like 
narrative, the edges between its so-called essential and nonessential elements are 
easily blurred when formal criteria is introduced into the picture, and, more often 
than not, such rigid criteria only manages to throw into sharp relief the necessity of 
allowing back in what had been bracketed out. In this respect, I think Rudrum 
(2006) is right to suggest that  
 
if one is going to try to formulate a definition of narrative, one would do better to 
focus on use rather than representation, but any such definition, like all definitions, 
is unlikely to prove satisfactory in the long term. . . . [T]he question of use is not a 
simple call for a use-based definition of what is . . . indefinite and probably 
indefinable. It is better understood as a call for a methodological reorientation of the 
way we go about conceiving narrative, and hence narratology. (p. 201) 
 
Despite the fact that Rudrum is primarily concerned with the direction of 
narratological studies, we would be well advised to take his advice when appraising 
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the argumentative value of narrative. If we ignore it, it becomes far too easy to slide 
into authoritarian, exclusionary, patriarchal, class-based, and other oppressive ways 
of arguing without even noticing it.3 The goal is to avoid what Gunther R. Kress 
(1989) identifies as the colonizing features of discourses that  
 
tend toward exhaustiveness and inclusiveness; that is, they attempt to account not 
only for an area of immediate concern to an institution . . . but attempt to account for 
increasingly wider areas of concern. . . . A metaphor which I use to explain the effects 
of discourse to myself is that of a military power whose response to border 
skirmishes is to occupy the adjacent territory. As problems continue, more territory 
is occupied, then settled and colonized. A discourse colonizes the social world 
imperialistically, from the point of view of one institution.4 (p. 7) 
 
Needless to say there is no avoiding this problem completely. But a good start for 
mitigating these ill effects is by acknowledging and coming to terms with narrative-
use as socially and culturally situated.  
 In fact, Deborah Schiffrin (1994) plausibly suggests that utterances are 
always situated both globally and locally where, in the former case, we draw “on our 
cultural knowledge and expectations about typical courses of action in recurrent 
situations, we construct story topics, themes and points” (p. 168); whereas in the 
latter case, “we verbally place our past experiences in, and make them relevant to, a 
particular ‘here’ and ‘now,’ a particular audience, a particular set of interactional 
concerns and interpersonal issues” (ibid.). Now, I remain unconvinced that this 
experience is organic and naturally occurs in the process of transforming “personal 
experience into a verbal performance” (ibid.) More often than not an awareness of 
these global and local factors has to be encouraged, and, for that reason, is perhaps 
better understood as a regulative ideal. 
 Admittedly, the very discussion of colonizing discourses might seem rather 
bizarre to many informal logicians (though certainly not to all of them). But it 
shouldn’t. Especially if we understand colonization as a “discursive practice that 
functions not merely as a direct power relationship between colonizer and 
colonized, but as a complex ideology that has been critical to ‘educating’ subjects 
and constructing notions of subjectivity, specifically gendered ones” (Hendry, 2011, 
p. 9). We need to be paying very close attention to any tendencies we might have 
that may be deemed as “epistemically imperialistic” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 
20). Especially since Phyllis Rooney (2010) has offered a compelling case that these 
tendencies are alive and well in the prevailing “philosophical and logical conceptions 
of argument and argumentation” that uncritically incorporate sexism-informed 
                                                        
3 Of course, this is a two-way street. And I agree with Maureen Linker (2011) when she says that “the 
very best elements of informal logic theory should make their way into social identity theory so that 
scholars and students can see how many systems of interlocking oppression and injustice are often 
the result of non-impartial, inaccurate, inconsistent, and non-reflective mistakes in reasoning” (p. 
113).  
4 Some might take issue with the discourses-as-war metaphor, but I think it is appropriate at least in 
this context since it effectively conveys the violence of epistemic subordination that results from 
these sorts of practices. The familiar argument-as-war metaphor, however, might be more 
appropriately construed in terms of colonization.  
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“competition and battle imagery” (p. 225). Indeed, many informal logicians often 
perpetuate (albeit unknowingly) “a misogyny-inflected cultural imagery” of 
adversariality that is a direct result of a problematic “historical metaphorical 
gendering of reason” (p. 211). Throughout this history, Rooney says, there has been 
a persistent depiction of “the man of reason” who continually battles “aspects of 
unreason regularly constructed as womanly or ‘feminine’—passion, instinct, nature, 
body, unruly bodily intrusions, or distracting charms” (pp. 211-212). Framed in this 
light, narrative is casted “as a more ‘feminine’ type of argument, especially when it is 
contrasted with the ‘masculine’ linear, logical, abstract forms of reasoning and 
argumentation that dominate philosophy’s self image” (p. 218). This state of affairs 
perhaps explains why the topic of narrative argument has been undertheorized and 
“given woefully little attention in philosophy and informal logic” (p. 216).  
 With this necessary backstory in place, I can now provide a fuller picture of 
the use-based approach to narrative argument and discuss its intersectional 
potential.  
  
3. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEMANDS OF INTERSECTIONALITY 
 
Undergirding the use-based approach to narrative argument with the support of an 
intersectional framework has the benefit of encouraging “scholars to recognize how 
their identities, the interpretations of which cannot be controlled, are implicated in 
knowledge construction and social interactions” (Ropers-Huilman & Winters, 2010, 
p. 44). Michael Gilbert (2007) has already asked this much of scholars in informal 
logic by turning their attention to “the intersectional matrix that might influence 
how we proceed in an argument or argument analysis” (p. 5). What we have yet to 
see, however, is what an intersectional lens has to offer for our assessments of 
narrative argument—a discussion I will take up in the next section. But first, it 
would be beneficial to review Gilbert’s intersectional approach as it directly relates 
to the latter project.  
 Rather than undermine the developments made by informal logicians like 
Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, Gilbert (2007) believes that we can broaden the 
applicability of their theoretical insights by incorporating an “awareness of the 
importance of examining the matrix of personal characteristics that belong or are 
applied to a group” (p. 2). “We always think about rules in IL,” Gilbert says, “but 
rarely consider situations in which it is difficult, unnatural or even dangerous to 
follow them” (ibid.). So while Gilbert would likely agree (though with some 
considerable hesitation) with Blair (1981) that, at least on some level, we have an 
“obligation to reason well” (p. 11); or that an arguer, as Johnson (2000) puts it, has 
certain “dialectical obligations” (p. 278), he would append a significant qualification 
to both accounts: “maintaining a set of rules that are intended to be useful for all 
people at all times in all situations is egregiously short-sighted” (Gilbert, 2007, p. 5). 
After all, “we would not suppose that the same values or beliefs hold in all contexts, 
so why should the same forms of reasoning, the same rules of assessment hold as 
well?” (p. 6).  
 Suffice it to say, any theoretical commitments or moral injunctions premised 
on a disembodied, timeless model of rationality are a telltale sign that a healthy dose 
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of epistemic humility is in order; namely, in the form of an awareness that 
circumstances  
 
can radically alter the kinds of evidence and rules of reasoning that will be and 
ought to reasonably be applied in diverse contexts. If we do not, then we are setting 
up standards, presumably largely designed by white, wealthy, Western, privileged 
males intended to be used by an enormous range of people from different 
backgrounds, classes, genders and cultures. (p. 9) 
 
Gilbert’s hope is that our epistemic blindspots can be brought out into the open by 
taking seriously what he dubs as the “the call for intersectionality,” which, in a 
nutshell, is a “a call for letting go of a one-size-fits-all approach to the analysis of 
argument, and a desire to see all of the significant characteristics that colour a 
person’s identity considered as part of the fit” (p. 5). On top of this, it asks us to 
consider an  
 
individual arguer’s life and situation, her gender, class, culture, and sexual 
orientation as epistemological factors that influence how she perceives and relates 
to the world. In describing as irrational argumentation processes that may be 
meaningful to the participants for reasons that may not speak to us, we judge by our 
standards actions that might require their own standards. The choices that some 
people living in poverty, living with discrimination, disease and oppression have to 
make may be strange to us; they are so far removed from the choices we have to 
make as to truly make them incomprehensible. Therefore, to judge the 
argumentation used as less than worthy ought to only come after a thorough 
investigation and understanding of its roots. (p. 11) 
 
Here we can see that Gilbert is not interested in democratizing an understanding of 
rationality to the point where it is rendered meaningless; rather, he is simply 
bringing to our attention the factors that are often unceremoniously brushed aside 
in our discussions of arguers, arguments, and the contexts that inform their 
positions.  
 A possible reason why the “one-size-fits-all” approach is so hard to let go of is 
because the prevailing linguistic paradigm of argumentation rests on an 
understanding of argument as “to one degree or another a product” [author’s 
emphasis] (Gilbert, 2003, p. 14).5 More specifically, there is the process of arguing 
and the confluence of contextual factors involved therein, and then there is the 
product fashioned by that process: an argument. For Gilbert, the problem is not so 
                                                        
5 From this basis Gilbert (2003) locates a divide between theorists who believe that “arguments and 
their premises must be linguistically explicable” (p. 2) and those who argue the contrary: that 
“discursiveness cannot be a requirement for something’s being a premiss in an argument, and that 
there are innumerable instances when we rely on non-discursive communications in order to put 
forward, respond to, and comprehend an argument” (pp. 1-2). The question at issue, then, is 
“whether or not we learn most about argument by studying it in isolation from its natural interactive 
habitat or from examining it in laboratory like isolation” (p. 3). If we adopt the latter approach, 
Gilbert claims, then we are committed to a standpoint that devalues the non-discursive elements of 
arguments tout court, which, he says, is a needlessly restrictive manoeuvre given that “few 
arguments ever occur without some parts being implicit” (p. 11).  
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much the idea of conceiving arguments as products (which, to be sure, has its 
upsides), but that the end product itself is taken to be “The Argument” (p. 14) and 
thus given undue primacy over the contextual features conditioning and framing its 
very possibility. Importantly, this means overlooking, among other salient features, 
how the colonizing aspects of discourses may have shaped the discussion and so the 
arguments therein; or how, as Rooney (2010) suggests, the link between gender and 
adversariality impacts, defines, and organizes argumentative space.6  
As Gilbert (2003) sees it, the argument-as-product is fearful of the possibility 
that “if there is no such differentiation [between process and product], then the 
argument becomes a morass, a swamp full of all sorts of things that cannot be 
separated” (p. 14). This, in turn, gives way to a dialectical tension where “allowing 
non-discursive entities into the idea of what is an argument needs to be avoided, but 
it cannot. It cannot because we have some instances where we have no doubt that 
the non-discursive elements are an integral part” (ibid.). No doubt, this is a 
legitimate concern. And it recalls some of the difficulties we confronted earlier when 
I suggested that in order to slip by the problems posed by definitional constraints 
we would need to opt for a use-based approach to narrative that is fluid, dynamic 
and more congruent with the ongoing construction of our socially and culturally 
situated identities. This in keeping with the demand made by intersectionality that 
“we drop broad categories and examine smaller groups in order to investigate the 
processes actually used there” (Gilbert, 2007, p. 8). Investigating “the processes 
actually used there” requires some heavy-duty empirical research. And I will only be 
able to offer a preliminary sketch of how the argumentative value of narrative arises 
in the context(s) of use, since an exhaustive account would go far beyond the small 
sample I provide in the next section. But even that, I think, will prove to be a unique 
step in the right direction given that empirical questions concerning narrative-use 
operate on the “ground floor” and remain to be rigorously incorporated into 
analyses of narrative argument.  
 So: in what lies ahead I will consider Govier and Ayers’ account of narrative 
argument. We will see that it hinges on some of the problematic theoretical 
foundations I discussed above. My modest suggestion is that any future 
investigations into narrative argument should be informed by the use-based 
approach—but that such an approach needs to be a carefully guided by an 
intersectional framework. In this way, we can render the uses of narrative and 
narrative arguments more plausibly with the aid of empirical results in this area. 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Lorraine Code (2006) makes the important point that such argumentative spaces need to be 
intricately examined to grasp how they “shape both knowing subjects and the objects of knowledge; 
how they legitimate and/or disqualify knowledge projects; how they are constituted by and 
constitutive of entrenched social imaginaries, together with the rhetoric that holds them in place” 
(pp. 40-41). While this raises interesting questions about argumentative space and its relation to 
narrative space, I cannot even begin to give that topic its proper due in this paper. Indeed, that is a 
project I intend to develop at a later date.  
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4. THE RATIONAL WORLD PARADIGM AND ITS ENEMIES  
 
Govier and Ayers’ (2012) take on narrative argument is fundamentally guided by 
their claim that arguments “are often made in efforts to rationally persuade some 
audience that a claim or claims are rationally acceptable” (p. 165).7 This leads them 
to ask the following question: “Can narrative serve to provide an argument for a 
claim that can reasonably be taken to be its ‘point’ or conclusion?” (p. 162). Even in 
this innocent question, the seeds have been planted for a definition of narrative 
argument that is limited by the assumptions conditioning its possible uses. Case in 
point: it does not take Govier and Ayers long to admit that they are primarily 
interested in seeing whether narrative provides a message that can be understood 
as offering an argument, which, in their hands, means that if 
 
we can plausibly derive an argument from narrative such as a parable, we can assess 
the merits of that argument, and scrutinize it to consider whether the narrative 
offers good reasons to support its message. If we cannot plausibly derive an 
argument, or can derive only a very weak argument from the narrative in question, 
that outcome undermines the view that the parable or story supplies a message 
supported by good reasons. (p. 163) 
 
Importantly, for Govier and Ayers the prospect of finding “good reasons” hinges on 
their being “expressed as propositions and as the premises of an argument in which 
the message of the parable is the conclusion” (p. 185). From this vantage point they 
examine several parables—which they take to be a “convenient and appropriate 
form of narrative because they are short and characteristically understood as 
conveying a serious message” (ibid.)—to determine whether it is an epistemically 
rewarding endeavour. We do not need to recast their discussion of each and every 
parable here. Instead, given their definitional constraints (which I will trace out in 
more detail momentarily), it is enough to focus on the conclusion of their 
investigation: “Conveying a message in the form of a story is attractive but logically 
risky and questionable, insofar as the form and interest of the story will often 
distract us from attempting any task of logical assessment” (p. 188). And while they 
acknowledge that it takes some “twisting and bending” to pull an argument out of a 
putative narrative, or parable in this case, and set it into a standardized form, they 
nevertheless end their analysis on a word of caution: “One can offer arguments 
through narrative, but doing that has more risks than benefits, from an epistemic 
point of view” (ibid.).8  
 To see operating conditions underlying their conclusion, it is instructive for 
our purposes to briefly consider Walter R. Fisher’s (1987) description of the 
                                                        
7 This formulation of Govier’s (2009) claim is a slight improvement over her earlier, less qualified 
claim that “when you use an argument, you are trying to persuade others of the claim that is your 
conclusion” (p. 25).  
8 Nowhere is this more apparent than in their analysis of Wilde and the “Parable of Magnets and 
Filings” where we are supposed to “twist and bend” our brains to such an extent that the premise 
“Humans are like personified metal filings in that they are physical objects fully subject to physical 
laws” (Govier & Ayers, 2012, p. 183) is rendered plausible. 
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dominance of the “rational-world paradigm” in Western thought, which has much in 
common with Gilbert’s linguistic paradigm we discussed earlier (which Govier and 
Ayers are clearly under the influence of) insofar as it adheres to the following five 
assumptions:  
 
(1) humans are essentially rational beings; 
 
(2) the paradigmatic mode of human decision making and communication is 
argument—discourse that features clear-cut inferential and implicative 
structures; 
 
(3) the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations—legal, scientific, 
legislative, public, and so on; 
 
(4) rationality is determined by subject-matter knowledge, argumentative ability, 
and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields; and 
 
(5) the world is a set of logical puzzles that can be solved through appropriate 
analysis and applications of reason conceived as an argumentative construct (p. 
59).  
 
With this kind of emphasis on rationality, it is unsurprising to discover that Govier 
and Ayers—situated squarely within the confines of the rational-world paradigm—
single out the “logical core” of an argument as being “constituted by its premises 
(explicit and implicit), indicators of its line of reasoning, and its conclusion or 
conclusions” (p. 166). These definitional constraints, which demarcate and minimize 
the supposed “non-core” elements of an argument (see the discussion of Rooney 
above as a reminder of what those are), naturally have a parasitic effect on their 
account of narrative argument and the conclusions they draw therein. 
 To be fair, Govier and Ayers (2012) confess (albeit in a footnote) that “there 
may be other important elements present when arguments are articulated in 
discourse” and that they include “emotive indicators; counter-considerations 
introduced by such terms as ‘even though,’ ‘while,’ and ‘despite the fact’; 
introductory material; asides such as jokes or illustrative anecdotes or elucidatory 
remarks; and attempts to rebut actual and potential objections to the premises, 
conclusion, or line of reasoning” (ibid., fn. 9). This list, aside from singling out some 
rather odd features of discourse, says nothing about the fact that not only do “we 
respond in anticipation of how we wish to be understood, but we verbally locate and 
position ourselves in relation to discourse contexts, thereby defining ourselves 
through what we say, how we say it, and to whom we say it” (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 
169). As we saw above with Rooney’s assistance, it is no coincidence that 
embodiment—and the phenomenology of bodily experience, feeling, and awareness 
that is involved and realized in the dynamic interplay between arguers, arguments, 
and audience—has often been pegged as nonessential as evinced by Govier and 
Ayers’ account of narrative argument.  
 When we shift our attention to arguments in terms of their use, the type of 
arguments Govier and Ayers discuss only function within the parameters of what 
Douglas Walton (2005) describes as a “persuasion dialogue.” In these dialogues, 
JUSTIN ROSS MORRIS 
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rational persuasion is the end goal and defined as “using an argument where all the 
premises are accepted by the respondent . . . [which is taken to be] rationally 
binding by some standard of [the] structural correctness of the argument” (p. 126). 
In this context, the arguers are aiming to get at the truth of the matter at hand. 
However, such arguments differ from those that arise in a “negotiation dialogue” 
where the goal is not so much truth-oriented as it is geared toward dividing up 
resources or making a deal. Given this, it seems that not all arguments address 
conflicts and resolution through rational persuasion. This is yet more evidence that 
not all arguments can be neatly described and defined in terms of rational 
persuasion in the sense that Govier and Ayers would have it. 
 But what are we to make of their claim that, when compared to logically 
stated arguments, “stories tend to be vivid, memorable, and emotionally appealing. 
From the point of view of logical cogency, there is a trap here: we risk persuasion on 
the basis of vividness and appeal, as distinct from relevant reasons” (Govier & Ayers, 
2012, p. 163). As I hinted at above, this is precisely where empirical results via a 
use-based approach to narrative might come in handy. Of course, we might have 
some cause for concern about the particular definition (and thus definitional 
constraints) of narrative that particular researchers subscribe to. Even so, it is still 
worth investigating why certain social psychologists, like Sonya Dal Cin, Mark P. 
Zanna, and Geoffrey T. Fong (2004), have suggested that if “narratives can be 
persuasive, then we might begin to consider situations in which narrative 
persuasion may prove particularly useful” (p. 176). Even though research 
demonstrating how persuasion operates empirically through narrative is in its 
infancy, the results of some preliminary studies suggest that Govier and Ayers have 
myopically focused on the risks presented by narrative-use at the expense of a more 
fruitful consideration of its potential argumentative rewards.  
 For instance, consider the notion of “narrative transportation” which is 
typically understood as “a convergent process, where all mental systems and 
capacities become focused on the events in the narrative” (Green & Brock, 2000, p. 
701). Some experiments found that the “more readers reported being transported 
by the narrative, the more they failed to see errors or faulty arguments in that 
narrative” (ibid.) and that, as a result of this, there is “support to the idea that being 
transported involves a certain degree of suspension or disbelief or logical 
inattention” (ibid.). Now, if this is true, then we might be inclined to agree with 
Govier and Ayers (2012) that narrative arguments are “rarely cogent” (p. 188) and 
thus their argumentative value epistemically suspect. But this is only half of the 
story. According to Dal Cin (et al.) narrative transportation can potentially have 
significant argumentative value as it “may be especially suited to overcoming 
resistance to persuasion” by encouraging “positive associations with specific beliefs 
and behaviours” (p. 180) that an arguer might have otherwise ignored or discounted 
on the basis of, say, irrational prejudices. It is well worth the space of a lengthy 
quotation to take a closer look at how Dal Cin and her colleagues approach the issue 
of overcoming these sorts of prejudices through narrative:  
 
[T]o overcome this type of resistance, it is necessary to avoid close-mindedness on 
the part of those we are trying to persuade. . . . Using rhetorical means of persuasion, 
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this may be accomplished by presenting a message that claims to support a 
generally acceptable position, but that actually supports a more extreme and 
possibly objectionable position—the so-called “Marc Anthony gambit”: After the 
assassination of Caesar, Shakespeare’s Marc Anthony, knowing his Roman audience 
loathed the dead emperor, began a speech with the words, “I come to bury Caesar, 
not to praise him.” He then proceeded to do exactly what he claimed he would not. 
By not raising the red flags of resistance in his fellow countrymen, Anthony 
managed to present counter-attitudinal arguments that may have otherwise earned 
him the same fate as Caesar. We believe that narratives might be ideally suited to 
this type of “under the radar” persuasive attempt. . . . [as] the counter-attitudinal 
message in a narrative may unfold so slowly, be so unexpected, be so subtle, that the 
reader [or addressee] fails to realize that the message falls within his or her latitude 
of rejection. We argue that to the extent that a narrative challenges an existing 
attitude without throwing up the barriers of closed-mindedness, we should find 
attitude change in the direction of the persuasive attempt. (p. 179) 
 
Again, what this tells us is that the potential benefits and disadvantages of narrative 
are, in practice, going to be largely determined by its use.9  
 Whether narrative poses an epistemic risk or reward, then, depends on how 
we respond to the question—complete with its sharp particularity—that I raised 
earlier: who (agent) is the narrator and what (act) is she hoping to achieve and why 
(aim)? If I have made my points clearly, it should be obvious that I do not think we 
can come up with a worthwhile answer unless we approach it through the prism of 
intersectional analyses in combination with these sorts of empirical results. Indeed, 
in some instances utilizing narrative “may be one of the only strategies available for 
influencing the beliefs of those predisposed to disagree with the position espoused” 
(Slater, 2002, 175). Imagine the implications this has for those individuals who 
would otherwise face epistemic injustice simply by virtue of their class, sexual 
orientation, gender, race, or any combination of those and other characteristics. 
Narrative may very well equip them with the ability to transform a hostile 
argumentative space in ways more favourable to their wellbeing (epistemic or 
otherwise). After all, these are individuals who already spend a great deal of time 
negotiating their way through oppressive discourse contexts. For as Dal Cin’s (et al.) 
findings suggest: close-minded individuals “have a number of resistance strategies 
at their disposal, and when the motivation to resist is high, they will engage in a 
variety of those strategies in their efforts to resist change” (p. 237). In the face of 
these disproportionate epistemic challenges are we really prepared to say that 
narrative poses an epistemic risk for marginalized individuals and groups when, in 
practice, it can allow their arguments to fly “under the radar” and operate as a 
corrective lens for irrational biases and prejudices that preclude the kind of rational 
                                                        
9 In this respect, while there is much to like about Patrick Bondy’s (2010) discussion of 
argumentative injustice and his suggestions for avoiding it “by identifying the identity prejudices that  
we have” (p. 270), it is, nevertheless, almost totally lacking in plausibility so long as it does not take 
into account these sorts of empirical results. For it is far from clear how—even if we were to adopt 
what he describes as a position of “metadistrust” against our more untoward inclinations and 
prejudices—cognitively ingrained biases can be deliberately held in abeyance in so explicit a manner 
(sometimes, for example, certain individuals hold downright unseemly prejudices near and dear to 
their hearts and thus feel no real motivation to be distrustful of them).  
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deliberation that Govier and Ayers put such a high premium on? I certainly hope 
not.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
I imagine that an immediate response to my arguments will be that I am just as 
guilty as Govier and Ayers of overemphasis but in my case I have elected to 
champion the rewards of narrative while glossing over the potential risks. Is it not 
true, one might argue, that given the pliability of narrative-use it could be used to 
further entrench problematic and oppressive features of a given discourse context? 
Undoubtedly, such risks are real and I do not underestimate them by any means. 
However, it is not my prerogative to deny their existence. At bottom, what am I 
suggesting is this: while we ought to be cognizant of the risks and rewards of 
narrative—especially when assessing its argumentative value—we should make it a 
top priority to avoid imposing a “partial, relativized view of things” and presenting it 
from a privileged perspective as though it were “impartial, absolute, and normative” 
(Daukas, 2011, p. 61). This means we need to let go of certain theoretical 
commitments, longstanding though they may be, whenever we hang onto them for 
their own sake. Doing so could obstruct what would otherwise be the fruitful 
development of an epistemically inclusive enterprise. 
 In the end, I think Gilbert (2007) is on to something when he says, “I believe 
the greatest honour that can be paid to those who have worked to advance Informal 
Logic is to treat it as a pragmatic, flexible, and exploratory undertaking” (p. 18). If 
anything, it is my hope that what I have proposed in this paper proves him right.  
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